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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
ARNOLD FRANCOM dba Day-Nite
Laundercenter No. 8
and
GLEN PALMER dba Day-Nite
Laundercenter No. 6,

I

\ Case No.
9271
Plaintiffs,

vs.
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,

Defendant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The sole question in this case is whether or not plaintiffs
render laundry services.
By statutory amendment, effective July 1, 1959, the Utah
sales tax was extended to and is no~· imposed upon nthe
amount paid or charged for laundry and dry cleaning services."
Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-4(g) (1953). Defendant has assessed
plaintiffs for sales tax under this section. Plaintiffs contend
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that they do not render laundry services but merely rent washing machines and dryers.
The facts have been stipulated by counsel for plaintiffs
and defendant respective! y and found to be such by defendant.
Specifically, in its Decision No. 180 relating to the sales tax
liability of plaintiff Francom, defendant found as facts (page 1)
that plaintiff Francom owns the building located at 29 Maple
Street, Midvale, Utah, known as Day-Nite Laundercenter No.·
8, in which there are housed about twenty coin-operated washing machines, about five coin-operated dryers, and other
facilities hereinafter referred to; that the building is open
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week; that all facilities
are available for the use of the general public at any time; and
that the cost to the customer of using the washing machines
and dryers is as follows: single load washer, 15c; double load
washer, 2 5c; dryer, 5c for 5 minutes.
Defendant further found as facts (pages 1 and 2) that
all users of the facilities must provide their own transportation
to and from the laundercenter and transport their own soiled
laundry to and clean laundry from the laundercenter, locate
unused washing machines for their own use, load their laundry
into the machines, set the time for soaking, washing, rinsing,
and spin-drying, start the machines, add soap and bleach,
unload the machines, cart or wheel their laundry to the dryers,
locate an unused dryer, load, start and unload the dryer, cart
or wheel their laundry to the folding table and fold their
laundry.
Defendant further found as facts (page 2) that there
is no employee or other attendant (including plaintiff Francom)
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on duty in or around the building at any time or for any purpose,
except as hereinafter stated. There is a coin-changing machine
and a soap and bleach vending machine. There is a posted
direction to call the owner in case of an emergency and a
special telephone available for that purpose. There are hanging
on the wall simple forms to fill out in case of a malfunctioning
washer or dryer. In such a case, the customer fills out both
halves of a form with a pencil hanging by the forms. One
half of the form is for the customer's name, address and
request for a refund of the amount of money lost in the malfunctioning machine. This half is deposited in the nstore
mail box,'' and plaintiff Francom sends the aggrieved customer the requested refund. The other half of the form is for
the number of the malfunctioning washer or dryer and a brief
description of what happened. This half is hung on the broken
machine by the customer to warn others against using the
machine. Plaintiff Francom periodically has all broken machines
repaired. There is a burglar alarm system. A patrolman makes
periodic checks of the premises. The lost-and-found department
is self operating. The customers deposit clothing which has
been left in the machines on hooks provided for this purpose.
The owner claims his articles simply by taking them down
from the hooks. Instructions for the operation of the machines
are printed on the machines and on wall posters. The premises
are cleaned periodically during the nighttime either by plaintiff
Francom or at his direction. Tables are provided for the
customers' use in folding their clothes. Movable carts are also
provided for the customers' use in transporting clothes to and
from the washers and dryers. Chairs and candy and soft drink
vending machines are provided for the use of customers.
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Defendant further found (page 3) the foregoing facts
to be, during the period from July 1, 1959, to and including ·
September 30, 1959, the operative facts of plaintiff Francom's
laundercenter; and that during the period from July 1, 1959,
to and including September 30, 1959, the gross receipts from
plaintiff Francom's laundercenter were as follows:
Double load washers ____________________ $1, 734.00
Single load washers ---------------------- 4 71.5 5
Top load washers -------------------------- 150.30
Dryers -------------------------------------------- 739.75
Soap and bleach ---------------------------- 121.15
Misceilaneous dispense ________________
3.30
Total gross receipts ------------------$3,220.05
Less refunds -------------------------20.8 5
Gross receipts ----------------------------$3,199.20
Plaintiff Francom filed no sales tax return and paid no sales
tax on the gross receipts from the laundercenter for the period
from July 1, 1959, to and including September 30, 1959. ·
Defendant further found as facts (page 3) that on December 19, 1959, plaintiff Francom received from defendant
a letter dated Decen1ber 17, 1959, transmitting a report of
the findings of the Auditing-Sales Division relative to plaintiff
Francom's sales tax liability for the period from July 1, 1959,
to and including September 30, 1959, and that said report
proposed an assessment in the amount of $89.52, computed
as follows:
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State sales tax ( 2% of net taxable
sales of $3,199.20) ----------------------------$63.98
Local tax ( ~/2 of 1% of net taxable
sales of $3,199.20) ---------------------------- 16.00
Total tax due --------------------------------$79.98
Penalty ( 10~iJ of $79.98) ______________ 8.00
Interest ( 12% per annum of
$79.98 for period from October
30, 1959, to December 28,
28, 19 59) ------------------------------------ 1. 54
Total amount due ----------------------$89.5 2
With respect to the sales tax liability of plaintiff Palmer,
defendant made identical findings of fact in its Decision No.
181, emplaying the following language:
"All statements made with respect to the findings
of fact in the Matter of the Sales Tax Liability of
Arnold Francom, d/b/a Day-Nite Laundercenter No.
8, except . . . [statements relating to gross receipts
and computations of sales tax liability J apply equally
well with respect to Day-Nite Laundercenter No. 6,
to the extent that the users of the machines and facilities elect not to engage the services of the attendant,
as hereinafter referred to, and are incorporated herein
by reference." (Page 1). (Plaintiff Palmer owns a different building, located at 1952 East 2700 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah, known as Day-Nite Laundercenter No. 6).
With respect to the attendant referred to, defendant found
as facts (page 1) that plaintiff Palmer employs one lady
attendant who 'vorks at the laundercenter from 10:00 a.m.
to 6:00 p.m. every day, Monday through Saturday, and that
plaintiff Palmer's customers may elect to leave their soiled
laundry with the attendant to be washed, dried, iron, folded
7
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and wrapped at the following prices: wash and dry, 55c for
a single load and $1.10 for a double load; wash only, 35c for
a single load; dry only, 35c; ironing, $1.00 per hour.
Defendant further found as facts (page 2) that the
dual nature of Day-Nite Laundercenter No. 6 is described
in a posted sign as follows: (tFrom 10 to 6 daily, except Sunday,
laundry attended-you may leave laundry to be washed, dried,
ironed, folded and wrapped-or do it yourself-anytime."
Defendant further found in its Decision No. 181 (page 2)
that during the period from July 1, 1959, to and including
September 30, 1959, the gross receipts from Mr. Palmer's
laundercenter were as follows:
Double load washers --------------------$1,180.2 5
Single load washers ______________________ 270.5 5
Top load washers -------------------------- 102.2 5
Dryers -------------------------------------------- 513.45
Soap ------------------------------------------------ 113.40
Total gross receipts ______________ $2, 179.90
Less refunds ---------------------13.95
Gross receipts ------------------------$2,165.95
Defendant further found as facts (page 2) that the report
of the Auditing-Sales Division proposed an assessment in the
amount of $60.60, computed as follows:
State sales tax ( 2% of net
taxable sales of $2,165.95) ----------------$43.32
Local tax ( Y2 of 1% of net
taxable sales of $2,165.95) -------------- 10.83
Total tax due --------------------------------$54.15
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Penalty ( 1O% og $54.15) ____________
Interest ( 12% per annum of
$54.15 for period from
October 30, 1959, to
December 28, 1959) ________________

5.41

1.04

Total amount due ----------------------$60.60
Plaintiffs filed timely petitions with defendant for a review
of the findings of the Auditing-Sales Division. Plaintiff Palmer
did not dispute his liability for sales tax measured by the re·
ceipts from the laundry services rendered by his hired attendant.
Nor did either plaintiff dispute his liability for sales tax
measured by the receipts from the sale of soap and bleach.
An informal hearing was held before defendant on February 10, 1960. It was there agreed that counsel for plaintiffs
and defendant would prepare a written stipulation of facts
for submission to defendant, on the basis of which defendant
would render its formal decision. The facts as stipulated were
submitted to defendant on March 21, 1960. Thereafter, on
April 18, 1960, defendant made identical conclusions of law
in its formal Decisions Nos. 180 and 181, as follows:
n1. Section 59-15-4(g), Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as amended, provides that there is to be levied, collected and paid within the state of Utah a tax based
on the amount paid or charged for laundry or dry
cleaning services.
n2. The activities of petitioner constitute a laundry
servtce.
n3. The petitioner is liable to the State Tax Commission for the collection of sales tax on said laundry
service as computed in Item 9 [Item 7 in DecisioP No.
181] of the above findings of fact.''
9
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Plaintiffs thereafter, on May 11, 1960, petitioned this
court for a hearing on their averments that defendant erred
in concluding as a matter of law that plaintiffs' activities constitute laundry services within the meaning of Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-15-4(g) (1953), and that defendant therefore erred in
concluding as a matter of law that plaintiffs are liable for the
collection and payment of sales tax. Plaintiff Palmer concedes
that his attendant performs laundry services, and references
hereinbelow to plaintiff Palmer's business mean his non-attendant business only.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The plain meaning of the term lC laundry services"

is

't acts

of

laundering;~

and therefore excludes all plaintiffs'

acts.
2. The Utah legislature did not intend to extend the sales

tax to plaintiffs' business.
3. Plaintiffs do not render laundry servtces within the
meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-4 (g) (1953).

ARGUMENT

I
THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE TERM lCLAUNDRY
SERVICES" IS lCACTS OF LAUNDERING" AND THEREFORE EXCLUDES ALL PLAINTIFFS' ACTS.
Plaintiffs' receipts derived, as found by defendant, from
allowing the general public to use coin-operated washing
10
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machines and dryers and related facilities owned by plaintiffs.
These receipts were not amounts npaid or charged for laundry ... services'' so as to be the basis of sales tax under Utah
Code Ann. § 59-15-4(g) (1953). Plaintiffs rendered no
laundry services. The terms ((services" and ttlaundry services"
must be construed according to the ((approved usage of the
language," pursuant to the mandate of Utah Code Ann. §
68-3-11 ( 1953), which provides:
ttWords and phrases are to be construed according
to the context and the approved usage of the language;
but technical words and phrases, and such others as
have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in
la\v, or are defined by statute, are to be construed
according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning
or definition."
This rule of stautory construction has been announced and
variously stated in a number of Utah cases. In Deseret Sav.
Bank v. Francis, 62 Utah 85, 217 Pac. 1114, 1115 (1923), this
court, without reference to the statutory rule, announced an
((ordinary sense" rule of construction in the following language:
(T]he presumption is that the words [of a statute]
are used in their ordinary sense, and if a different interpretation is sought it must rest upon something in
the character of the legislation or in the context which
\vill justify a different meaning [citations]."
tt

In Cache Auto Co. v. Central Garage, 63 Utah 10, 221 Pac.
862 ( 1923), this court reiterated and employed the ((ordinary
sense" rule of statutory construction. This court stated that
the legislative napproved usage" rule and the judicial ((ordinary
sense" rule are the same, in the following language:
11
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"~fhe plainest and perhaps the most important rule
of construction is that unless technical terms are used
the words employed must be given their usual and
ordinary meaning. This is not only a general rule
recognized in every jurisdiction of the country, but is,
in effect, the rule declared by statute.'' 221 Pac. at 864.

On still other occasions, this court has declared the same
rule of statutory construction. In State v. Hendrickson, 67 Utah
15, 245 Pac. 375, 378 ( 1926), this court stated:
"(T)he fundamental rule recognized in every jurisdiction of the country [is] that words and phrases are
construed according to the context and the approved
usage of the language. Except in the case of technical
words and phrases, they must be construed according
to their plain and ordinary meaning."
In State v. Navaro, 83 Utah 6, 26 P.2d 955, 956 (1933), this
court stated:
''Under the ordinary canons of construction of
statutes we are required to give the word its plain,
natural, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning,
in the absence of any statutory or well-established
technical meaning, unless it is plain from the statute
that a different meaning is intended.''
The terms "services'' and ('laundry services" are not
technical words. They have not acquired "a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law.'' They are not defined by statute. Neither
the character of the legislation nor the context justifies a
meaning different from their ordinary meaning. Therefore,
under the rule declared by statute and announced by this court,
the terms must be given their "plain, natural, ordinary and
commonly understood n1eaning.''
12
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Webster's New International Dictionary ( 2d ed. 1946)
lists twenty-nine different meanings (not counting sub-meanings) of the noun "service" when used in the singular, and one
meaning when employed in the plural. In the context of Utah
Code Ann. § 59-15-4(g) (1953), plaintiffs submit that the
following meanings alone are appropriate:
[singular]
tc2. Performance of labor for the benefit of another,
or at another's command; attendance of an inferior,
hired helper, slave, etc.

* * *
tc4. The deed of one who serves; labor performed
for another; duty done or required; office.

*

*

*

[plural]
"22. Usually in pl. Any result of useful labor which

does not produce a tangible commodity. In economics,
such business concerns as railroads, telephone companies, or laundries, and such persons as physicians,
are regarded as performing services.

*

* *

(CSyn.- Servitude, employ; ministry, mtntstration,
attendance; aid, help; favor, kindness." Ibid. (Emphasis
added except for pl. and services.)
These definitions show clearly that the rendering of services
implies attendance or the performance of labor-some activity
or participation on the part of the person rendering the services.
This implication was recognized and accepted by this
court in the instructive case of Creameries of America, Inc.
13
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v. Industrial Comm'n, 98 Utah 571, 102 P.2d 300 ( 1940). In
that case, the question was whether or not one of the defendants
was entitled to unemployment compensation. This depended
upon whether or not the defendant performed ((services for
wages" within the tneaning of the Unemployment Compensation Act. In the course of its opinion, this court stated:
((The term (services' and (personal service' used in
defining (wages~ are not specifically defined in the Act.
In ordinary usage the term (services' has a rather broad
and general meaning. It includes generally any act
performed for the benefit of another under some arrangement or agreement whereby such act was to have
been performed. The general definition of (service' as
given in Webster's New International Dictionary is
(performance of labor for the benefit of another'; (Act
or instance of helping, or benefiting'. The term (personal service' indicates that the (act' done for the
benefit of another is done personally by a particular
individual." 102 P.2d at 304.
Thus, the term ({services" implies an act, and in ordinary
usage is broad and general enough to include any act ((performed for the benefit of another under some arrangement."
Where the word is modified, however, as in the term ((personal
service," any such act is not included within the meaning of
the term, but only acts ((done personally by a particular individual." Similarly, where the ({services" are ((laundry services,"
there must not only be an act, but an act of a particular kind,
i.e., a laundry act, or more meaningfully, an act of laundering.
More commonplace sources than judicial opinions and
dictionaries may be consulted in determining what the term
((laundry services" means in ordinary usage. See State v. Na11·aro_.
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supra, 1n which this court referred to magazines and newspapers in an effort to determine the ordinary meaning of the
\\'Ord "n1arijuana." Plaintiffs submit that an excellent indication of the ordinary meaning of the term c c laundry services''
is found in the yellow pages of the Salt Lake City telephone
directory. Here there is a section headed by "Laundries," and
another section headed by ccLaundries-Self Service,'' a dichotomy implying that laundries are of two types and ordinarily
understood to be such, i.e., those in which the acts of laundering are performed for the customer, and those in which
the acts of laundering are performed by the customer, for
himself. In other words, a cclaundry" does, but a ccself-service
laundry" does not, perform laundry services for its customers.
Often a coin-operated laundry will be of both types, as
revealed in the yellow page advertisements of the several
coin-operated laundries, e.g., ccself service or drop off service";
ccdrop off or self service"; ccfast drop bundle service or V2 hr.
coin-operated self service"; and ccself service or drop bundles".
But whether a laundry is of one or both types, the distinction
between the types is well, widely and common! y understood,
as evidenced by the apparent faith of the advertising agencies
in the communicative efficacy of these abbreviated advertisements.
The facts as found by defendant are clear. All acts of
laundering are performed by the customers from the time he
leaves his home with his soiled laundry until he returns to his
home with his clean laundry. On the other hand, ccthere is no
employee or other attendant (including Mr. Francom [and
~{r. Palmer]) on duty in or around the building at any time

15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

or for any purpose,'' except to perform such non-laundry acts
as refilling the coin-changing and the soap and bleach vending
machines, answering emergency calls, refunding money, fixing
the machines, and cleaning the premises. (Decision 180, page
2). Clearly plaintiffs perform no laundry services, and there-_
fore Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-4(g) (1953) by its terms is
inapplicable.
Plaintiffs' receipts were the consideration paid for the
use of property and as such constituted rent. Black, Law
Dictionary (4th Ed. 1951) . Instructive on this point are cases
arising in New York and Ohio. In each case the question was
whether the subject business was that of renting machines
or rendering services, there being a sales tax on rentals but not
on services. In each case the owner either operated or participated in the operation of the machines leased to his customers
(unlike plaintiffs Francom and Palmer), and yet in each
case it was decided that the operation or participation did
not change the business from that of renting property to that
of rendering services.
In New York City, the sales tax law defines sales to include rentals as follows:
ctAny transfer of . . . possession . . . license to use
... conditional or other\vise, in any manner or by any
means whatsoever for a consideration, or any agreement therefor." Administrative Code, Sec. N41-l.O,
subd. 5.
In Buckley Funeral Home, Inc._. v. City of Neu· York,
105 N.Y.S.2d 478 ( 1948), a funeral director rented autotnobiles from an automobile rental agency for his customers.

16
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The rental agency furnished the drivers. Held, the rental
agency was not furnishing services but was ((selling", i.e.,
renting, within the meaning of the statute.
In Ohio, the sales tax law defines sales to include rentals
of tangible personal property as follows:
(A ]11 transactions whereby title or possession, or
both, of tangible personal property, is or is to be transferred, or a license to use or consume tangible personal
property is granted, for a consideration in any manner,
whether absolutely or conditionally, whether for a
price or rental . . . " Section 5739.01, Revised Code.
cc

In Randall Park Jockey Club, Inc. v. Peck, 162 Ohio 245, 122
N.E. 2d 787 ( 1954), a manufacturer delivered possession of
pari-mutuel machines to a jockey club which conducted_ horse
racing and pari-mutuel betting. The sole question as stated by the
court was whether or not there was a lease of pari-mutuel
equipment or, in relation to such equipment, a service was
rendered by the manufacturer. The court examined the activities of the taxpayer with respect to the machines in order to
determine whether the nature of the transaction was essentially
that of leasing machines or that of rendering services. The
manufacturer had from two to ten employees present during
the operation of the machines to school the jockey club's
employees iri their use, to service them and afford a constant and continuing operation of the equipment, and to lock
them after the wagering ended. Held, the manufacturer did
not render services, but leased the machines. There was an
indication that had the taxpayer's employees actually operated
the machines, they would then be rendering services. As it
was, however, rrthe compensation was made for the use of
17
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the machines and constituted a rental payment therefor."

122 N.E. 2d at 789. (Emphasis added.)
A fortiori, plaintiffs' business is that of renting coinoperated washers and dryers.

II
THE UTAH LEGISLATURE DID NOT INTEND TO
EXTEND THE SALES TAX TO PLAINTIFFS' BUSINESS.
(T]he primary rule of construction of statutes is to
ascertain and declare the intention of the legislature . . .. "
50 Am. Jur. Statutes § 223 ( 1944). This court has similarly
declared in Price v. Tuttle, 70 Utah 156, 258 Pac. 1016, 1017
(1927):
u

Uin the construction of statutes it is the duty of
courts to ascertain the intent of the legislative body
and . . . to enforce that intent. In determining the
intent of legislation not only the language of the act
may be considered, but the purposes or objects sought
by the Legislature should be and are considered by
the courts in determining the legislative intent."
The relationship of general rules of statutory cons~ruction
(such as the ((plain n1eaning'' rule discussed under I above)
to this ({primary rule of construction" has been stated as
follows:
nin the interpretation of a statute, the intention of
the legislature is gathered from the provisions enacted
by the application of sound and well settled canons of
construction. However, every technical rule as to the
construction of a statute is subservient and- must yield
18
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to the expression of the paramount will of the legis- ·
lature, since all rules for the interpretation of statutes
of doubtful meaning have for their sole object the
discovery of the legislative intent . . . " 50 Am. Jur.
Statutes § 224 ( 1944).
Inasmuch as the Utah legislature has not indicated in any
\vay that it intended to employ the term C(laundry services"
other than in its ordinary sense, it would appear that the discussion under I above would be conclusive on the question
of legislative intent.
It would also appear circumstantially that the Utah
legislature did not intend to extend the sales tax to plaintiffs'
business.
The legislature has categorically declared that ((the vendor
shall collect the tax from the vendee . . . . " Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-15-5 ( 1953). C(Vendor" is defined to include every
person receiving any payment or consideration upon a sale
of service subject to the sales tax. I bid. If the legislature
intended to extend the sales tax to plaintiffs' business, then
it of necessity also intended plaintiffs and others similarly
situated to collect the tax from their customers.
How, under the circumstances, are plaintiffs to collect
the tax from their customers? An employee for such purpose,
\VOrking less than one-third of the business hours (eight out
of each twenty-four hours, six instead of seven days a week)
and for only twenty-five cents an hour, would cost plaintiff
Francom more than one and one-half times, and plaintiff
Palmer more than two and one-half times, the amount of
taxes collected. Obviously the intricate coin-receiving mecha-
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nism of the washers and dryers could be converted to receive
the penny tax only at great expense. To reduce the rental
cost of the washers a penny so that no conversion would be
necessary would be simply to absorb the tax which would be
contrary to the legislative intent, unfair to plaintiffs and
others similar! y situated, and would convert the sales tax in
the case of self-service laundries from a tax on the consumer
to a gross income tax on the seller.
Under plaintiffs' circumstances, the practical impossibility
of passing the tax on to the customer is so evident it is
unreasonable to assume that the legislature intended to include
self-service laundries within the scope of the amendment but
either overlooked this practical impossibility or recognized
it but failed to make some counteracting or alleviating provision for it. Therefore only the contrary can be reasonably
assumed: the Utah legislature did not intend to extend the
sales tax to plaintiffs' business.

III

PLAINTIFFS DO NOT RENDER LAUNDRY SERVICES WITHIN THE MEANING OF UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 59-15-4(g) (1953).
If any doubts and ambiguities as to the meantng · of
"laundry services" remain after the application of the rules
discussed in I and II above, they should be resolved in accordance with the rule of strict construction of taxing statutes.
This rule and its relationship to the two previously dis20
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cussed are explained in 47 Am. Jur. Sales and Use Taxes § 1"1
( ]l)·l ?>)

:
(CThe usual rules of statutory construction are applicable to the interpretation of sales tax statutes. Thus,
the courts, in construing such a statute, must attempt
to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
legislature in adopting it . . . . [T]he statute should
receive a reasonable interpretation, and words used
therein must ordinarily be given their usual and popular
meaning. On the other hand, since sales tax enactments
are revenue measures, the general rule that tax statutes
will be strictly construed and that doubts and ambiguities \vill be resolved in favor of the taxpayer and
against the taxing power is applicable . . . "

This is the law in Utah, as announced on many occaSions by this court. See Los Angeles & S.L.R. Co. v.
Richards, 52 Utah 1, 172 Pac. 474 ( 1918); W. F. Jensen
Candy Co. v. State Tax Comm'n 1 90 Utah 359, 61 P.2d 629
( 1936); Norville Z'. State Tax Comm'n, 98 Utah 170, 97 P.2d
93 7, 940 ( 1940), in which it was stated that the rule of
strict construction is applicable (Cin case of doubt as to the
intention of the legislature"; Moss ex rei. State Tax Comm'n
z·. Board of Con1n/rs 1 1 Utah 2d 60, 261 P.2d 961 ( 1953).

If there are any remaining doubts about the resolution
of the question raised in this case, it would be hard to imagine
a situation in which the application of the rule of strict construction could be more appropriate.

CONCLUSION
Regardless of which rule of statutory construction IS
applied, the result is the same: plaintiffs rendered and render
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no laundry services within the meaning of Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-15-4(g) (1953). Defendant's decision should be reversed
and its deficiency assessment expunged.
Respectfully submitted,
EARL M. WUNDERLI
FABIAN AND CLENDENIN
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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